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“Frame” capture – why the war on poaching can never be won:
about the John Hanks’ book Operation Lock and the war on rhino
poaching
Ray Ison1,* and Duan Biggs2
1 Professor of Systems, The Open University, UK
2 Senior Research Fellow, Environmental Futures Research Institute, Grifﬁth University, Nathan, Queensland, Australia
Ray Ison et Duan Biggs nous invitent ici à réﬂéchir à l’exigence d’une pensée systémique qui ne se contente pas de prendre la
réalité comme un système. Cette pensée commence par reconsidérer la façon dont le concepteur du système se projette dans la
problématique aﬁn d’agir dans une situation complexe incluant sa propre pensée.
La Rédaction
Abstract – Thisessay is anextendedandcritical review,of JohnHanks’bookOperationLockand thewaron
rhino poaching, which is an insider account of hitherto untold stories of a secretive undercover operation to
gather intelligence to counter the ongoing slaughter of Africa’s elephants and rhinos. Our critique employs the
metaphor “ecologyofmind”, followingGregoryBateson, to highlight howsomuchconservation effortwith an
espoused focus on improving natural ecologies fails at the level of “mind”, in particular the choices that are
made to frame situations of concern. The outcome, we argue, is persistent framing failure. This failure, despite
the efforts of Hanks with his authentic cry formore effective action, runs the risk of institutionalising systemic
failure. Hanks consistently espouses support for local community as key stakeholders in the future of
conservation  but his book lacks evidence of investment, good practice examples and institutional and
governance reformsneeded to create and sustain such initiatives. Indeed, the framingof the poaching challenge
as a war presents barriers to ﬁnding systemic and sustainable solutions to the crisis.
Keywords: poaching / rhino / local communities / illegal wildlife trade / conservation / institutions / war
metaphor
Résumé – Pourquoi la guerre contre le braconnage n’a aucune chance d’aboutir : un
problème de cadrage. À propos de l’ouvrage de John Hanks L’opération Lock et la guerre
contre le braconnage des rhinocéros. Ce texte est une analyse critique approfondie de l’ouvrage de
John HanksOperation Lock and the war on rhino poaching, récit inédit d’une opération sous couverture à la
ﬁn des années 1980 chargée de collecter des informations visant à lutter contre le massacre des éléphants et
des rhinocéros toujours en cours en Afrique. Nous employons la métaphore d’« écologie de l’esprit »,
introduite par Gregory Bateson, pour souligner combien tant d’efforts de conservation, dont le but déclaré
est d’améliorer les écosystèmes naturels, échouent au niveau de « l’esprit », en particulier concernant les
choix faits pour « cadrer » des situations préoccupantes. Cela conduit, selon nous, à des erreurs permanentes
de « cadrage ». Malgré le vibrant plaidoyer de Hanks en faveur d’actions plus efﬁcaces, ces erreurs risquent
d’aboutir à une institutionnalisation de l’échec systémique. Hanks défend l’idée que les communautés
locales sont des acteurs-clés de l’avenir de la conservation, mais il manque dans son livre des preuves
d’investissements, des exemples de bonnes pratiques et de réformes institutionnelles et de gouvernance
nécessaires pour créer et soutenir de telles initiatives. En effet, envisager la lutte contre le braconnage
« comme une guerre » fait obstacle à la recherche de solutions systémiques et durables à cette crise.
Mots-clés : braconnage / rhinocéros / communautés locales / commerce illégal d’espèces sauvages /
conservation / institutions / métaphore de la guerre
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This book1, tagged as the “breaking of a 25 year
silence”, exempliﬁes an attempt at “out of the box” action
gone wrong: “a sad story dominated by the gruesome
realities of mutilated rhinos and compounded by some
of the worst attributes of humankind”. This engaging
insider account, written in authentic voice, tells the
hitherto untold stories of a secretive undercover
operation to gather intelligence to counter the ongoing
slaughter of Africa’s elephants and rhinos. Operation
Lock (1988-1990) included conservation and military
elites: David Stirling of SAS notoriety from the British
Special Forces, Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands and
other conservation notables including, at the periphery,
Prince Philip of the House of Windsor. Operation Lock
collected information at the highest levels of African
politics about who was involved in the high value illicit
trade of wildlife products and used this information to
design interventions many of which were secret. The
conservation organisation WWF (World Wildlife Fund)
played a central role. The “operation” was funded
through sale of pictures owned by Queen Wilhelmina of
the Netherlands and overseen by her husband, Prince
Bernhard.
Hanks, then based with WWF was the main
operational intermediary with Prince Bernhard. British-
born Hanks was fascinated by Africa from a young age;
following a Cambridge Natural Sciences Tripos and
PhD in Zoology, he went on to work across African
conservation issues in his career including at WWF
headquarters in Gland Switzerland as director of global
conservation programs and in Stellenbosch South Africa
as CEO of WWF South Africa. In all he has spent over
45 years working in Africa.
Hanks’ central narrative is a parable of our times
exemplifying all that is going wrong with human
thinking and doing of the sort that concerned Bateson
many years ago. It would be easy to fall into a trap of
thinking that the out of control poaching of the great
mega fauna is ecology out of control. But not an ecology
as most now understand the term. Gregory Bateson,
polymath, systems thinker, husband of Margaret Mead
and son of the founder of modern genetics, William
Bateson, used a more appropriate framing when he called
his best remembered work Steps to an ecology of mind2.
This is the ecology that is out of control and to which
Hanks’ book speaks as exempliﬁed by the way the
conservation community perceives, chooses to frame,
and respond to the poaching crisis.
A story about an undeclared war begun in the 1960s
and which continues today is recounted; it is also a story
about a war that has not been, and never will be, won. The
only winning to be done is to succeed in breaking out of
the trap of framing the rhino situation as a war before
embarking on actions that may be systemically desirable
and culturally feasible. It is around the question of
reframing that our review is structured. George Lakoff
has written that:
“All thinking and talking involves ‘framing’. And since
frames come in systems, a single word typically activates
not only its deﬁning frame, but also much of the system its
deﬁning frame is in. Moreover, many frame-circuits have
direct connections to the emotional regions of the brain.
Emotions are an inescapable part of normal thought.
Indeed, you cannot be rational without emotions3.”
Lakoff’s claims are insightful as they draw attention
to the consequences of framing choices. In other words it
is not possible to avoid the situated and embodied nature
of our engagement with the world, for which we each
must take responsibility. Responsibility begins when
people in a situation recognise they have agency with
respect to their framing choices. Through the vehicle of
the “rhino issue” we draw out the systemic implications
of consistently adopting a “war” framing compared to
alternatives. But there is an important point to be made
ﬁrst. Because, in everyday life, we lose sight of socially
and culturally habituated framing choices, we have lost
capacity to operationalise our agency in situations of
1Hanks J., 2015. Operation Lock and the war on rhino
poaching, Penguin Books.
2 Bateson G., 1972. Steps to an ecology of mind, Chicago,
University of Chicago Press.
3 Lakoff G., 2010. Why it matters how we frame the
environment, Environmental Communication, 4, 1, p. 71.
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great concern like high levels of rhino and elephant
poaching. The social planners Ernst Rittel and Melvin
Webber invented the pair of terms “wicked” and “tame”.
A tame problem is one that can be solved, whereas a
wicked problem is one that requires the ongoing
governance and adaptive management of a complex
and uncertain situation.
It is now well known that there has been consistent
public policy failure because the implications of the
distinctions “wicked” and “tame” have failed to be built
into the practices of those who seek to govern, or for that
matter seek to act purposefully in relation to, any public
policy issue. From this perspective “war” is an ill-suited
framing choice; war is a choice to frame the poaching
crisis as a tame problem, something that is winnable or
solvable. Instead war, any war, can be understood as an
emergent property of the failure to govern situations
usefully framed as “wicked”. We emphasise that
adopting a wicked or tame framing choice is not an
act of categorisation; the choice needs to be understood
as a choice about boundary, i.e., expanding or contracting
boundary choices to incorporate the dynamics that if
acted upon, or transformed, can actually make a
difference.
The factors that make conserving Africa’s wildlife
intractable are explored at length by Hanks; to the un-
initiated it is important to appreciate how the Convention
on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora (CITES) was instituted in 1977. Since
then, the international trade of rhino horn of any species
has been illegal. The ban on the trade in ivory was enacted
in 1989, and other than special permission for one-off
sales from southern African countries, trading has not
been permitted. These dynamics, usefully illuminated by
Hanks, constitute the current area of controversy in
deciding how to act. Should CITES bans be maintained
and more effort focused on investment in all the means
of effective contemporary warfare? But where does the
money for investment come from and how is the war to
be pursued? Or should trade in horn be allowed under
a regulated market? Horn can be harvested from
rhino without killing the animal and if legally tradeable
can also generate funds for conservation and poverty
alleviation?
We have some experience of the issues at hand,
primarily through connections to the main battleﬁeld in
the current theatre of war, namely Kruger Park, the jewel
in South African National Parks’ (SANParks’) crown.
Many arguments put forward by Hanks accord with our
experience, especially in relation to the post-2007 surge
in the poaching of rhinos, and the various (failed)
attempts to manage it. Hanks argues that radical changes
in the status quo are advocated before any sustainable
success is likely to be experienced in conserving the
continents’ high value iconic species, concluding that:
“the future of the continent’s wildlife will be decided by
Africa’s people, speciﬁcally those who live with these
species on a daily basis, and not by conservationists far
removed from the daily struggles for survival, increasing
poverty and declining food security” (p. 291). In reaching
this conclusion Hanks is implicitly, if not explicitly,
revealing the limitations of the war framing; he clearly
situates himself in the policy and governance reform
camp by acknowledging the centrality of rural people
and their sustainable livelihoods and recognising that
“wildlife will not survive unless it has a value and can
pay its own way”. His conclusions will be hard to accept
by many but they are compelling.
Hanks offers the beginnings of a reframing that might
take the rhino issue into an improved space; but he does
not go far enough. Although both elephant and rhino are
iconic species, the policy and practice dynamics for rhino
and elephant differ; lumping them together is a trap in
thinking and practice, as is beginning the conversation
with iconic species in the ﬁrst place. Instead the
conversation needs to begin with habitat conservation
and people-animal (or people-“nature”) relations. Hanks
makes many insightful observations that will help with
this reframing.
A more useful framing?
In the past exaggeration of numbers of animals
killed has been used to manipulate and mislead to help
with fund-raising campaigns, actions Hanks describes
as “dishonest and fundamentally fraudulent” (p. 116).
Furthermore, the reality of the outcomes of policy diffe-
rences between southern and east Africa on poaching and
wildlife numbers has become badly twisted or altogether
forgotten. The strategy promoted by many international
NGOs is focused on bans and enforcement, and shirks
at any suggestion of allocating rights of wildlife to land-
holders and communities to choose how they want to
utilise this wildlife. Indeed, calls by South African con-
servation stakeholders and the government of Swaziland
for a legal trade in horn have been widely condemned as
an irresponsible idea that will only lead to an escalation
in poaching. Facts about a rights and use-based approach
to conservation paint a very different picture. By 1985
there were only 20 southern white rhino left in South
Africa. They had been hunted to extinction elsewhere.
Through years of effective protection, southern white
rhino numbers increased to over 8,000 by 1997 and over
20,000 today4.
4 Emslie R., Brooks M., 1999. African rhino: status survey and
conservation action plan, Gland (Switzerland) and Cambridge
(UK), IUCN.
R. Ison and D. Biggs: Nat. Sci. Soc. 25, 1, 63-69 (2017) 65
This tremendous recovery was supported by policies
enabling ownership of rhino and their utilisation through
activities such as trophy hunting. These use-based
policies did not only beneﬁt rhino populations: the
numbers of large mammals in South Africa increased
ﬁve-fold from 600,000 in the 1960s to 2.5 million
today. Similarly, a use-based approach to elephant
conservation in Namibia and Zimbabwe contributed to a
166% and 425% growth in elephant numbers respec-
tively in the space of two decades5. Kenya in contrast,
instituted a complete hunting ban in 1977 and there is
no private ownership of wildlife. Over two decades from
the institution of the hunting ban elephant numbers
decreased by nearly 90% inKenya from 170,000 down to
20,000. Although numbers have stabilised and increased
slightly since 1990 – the reality of these numbers and
the implications for conservation policy are absent
from NGO and media discussions. Instead, the implicit
message and implication from many media reports, and
the position of many international NGOs is that countries
like South Africa and Zimbabwe should follow the
Kenyan model. The real consequences and outcomes of
these alternative policy choices are not communicated
to the broader public.
Clearly an initiative that is needed is a social media
platform to report what is, or is not happening, trends and
patterns, conceived to maximise transparency and to
avoid simplistic positioning on the issue. Something like
“WildLeaks” is one such possibility. Ideally reporting to
the site should be feasible as long as some veriﬁcation
process and/or coding is available for any claims that
are made.
Good investigative journalism helps
Julian Rademeyer’s Killing for proﬁt: exposing the
illegal rhino horn trade6 is rightfully acknowledged by
Hanks as complementary to his own book; Rademeyer
explores the growth and exploitation of demand for rhino
horn in Vietnam and, to a lesser extent, China and also
unpacks distortions and exploitation within the trophy
hunting sector, particularly in South Africa. On the other
hand well-intentioned campaigns on social media (e.g.,
Avaaz, an independent, not-for-proﬁt global campaign-
ing organization that claims to work to ensure that the
views and values of the world’s people inform global
decisions) run the risk of falling into un-nuanced,
decontextualized, actions that carry with them their own
framing limitations. Hanks rails against sloppy reporting
and press manipulation. As with The Guardian’s Nick
Davies, Hanks has come to see much of the media as
peddlers of distortion “and [an] industry whose task
should be to ﬁlter out falsehood has become a conduit for
propaganda and second hand news” (p. 163).
Political spin
Political spin has been a consistent feature involving
not only governments but also conservation organisa-
tions, especially those seeking to protect brand, client
and donor base and particular value or ideological
positions. There has been compelling evidence for many
years that “degraded agricultural land could be rehabili-
tated and made more productive and proﬁtable by
utilising wildlife rather than cattle” (p. 75). One only has
to ﬂy in to Hoedspruit in the South African Lowveld on
the border of the Kruger National Park to appreciate how
successful this strategy has been but “support for
conservation on private land linked to a successful
wildlife utilisation programme”, has for Hanks “received
far too little credit or recognition... and even today is the
subject of ill-informed criticism” (p. 75).
Elites operating illegally largely control
both the supply-side and demand-side
dynamics of poaching of both species
Hanks’ account of the role played by the family of
Kenya’s ﬁrst president, Jomo Kenyatta, in ivory
poaching (pp. 70-73) will be compelling reading for
some, especially given Kenya’s predisposition to burn
conﬁscated ivory in large symbolic acts. Hanks is not
impressed by such actions.
In the midst of Operation Lock, Hanks accompanied
Prince Bernhard on a WWF-organised visit to meet the
state presidents and senior conservation ofﬁcials in
Kenya, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi and Tanzania.
Reﬂecting on this experience Hanks says “although
we were certainly aware of the existence of corruption at
the highest level in the ﬁve countries we visited, it was
only some years later that the true extent of the blatant
plundering of state resources by those in power came to
light”. At the end of this trip Hanks reminded Prince
Bernhard of one of the ﬁndings from the ﬁrst “Operation
Lock” report: “all the States with a rhino population have
attempted to conform to some kind of prohibition and
law against poaching but these actions must be seen as
more of a sop to western criticism rather than a natural
and sincere reaction” (p. 89).
Corruption remains a serious, ongoing impediment
to dealing with this crisis, but the role of European
colonisation in creating the conditions for this corruption
to emerge is little recognised by Hanks nor are the
5 http://mjperry.blogspot.com.au/2011/06/how-to-save-ele
phants-shoot-them.html.
6 Rademeyer J., 2012. Killing for proﬁt: exposing the illegal
rhino horn trade, Cape Town, Zebra Press.
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implications of historical relationships between black
ethnic groups and wildlife, particularly large and often
dangerous wildlife, given attention. A question demand-
ing attention is whether there is cultural and/or political
indifference to wildlife among emergent black elites and
others at local level except where they act to provide a
sop to western interests? What are the dispositions within
South Africa’s ruling African National Congress, for
example? Sadly despite the control exercised by elites it
is the poacher, usually poor and easily replaced, and the
rhino or elephant who are the main victims of “war”.
Financial ﬂows, economics and equity
Hanks (p. 131) building on economic analyses argues
strongly that the “option of restoring a legal trade in ivory
should not be dismissed out of hand. The arguments in
favour of reconsidering the trade ban are gaining strength
and credibility and the same argument applies to the
conservation of rhino”. Hanks describes his own parting
of the ways with WWF over its opposition to trade and
domestication, arguing, following Bonner’s 1993 book
At the hand of man: peril and hope for Africa’s wildlife7
that the then WWF leadership completely missed the
point that “not nearly enough had been done to recognise
and address the realities of poverty afﬂicting the majority
of the continent’s population and that most NGOs were
guilty of... a ‘culturally biased Western solution’”
(p. 143).
Organisational jockeying, entrenched
silos and poor management practices
Within conservation organisations and ministries
poor management characterised by “divide-and-rule; no
loyalty to staff; excessive politisation [sic] of decisions
depending on how they affect the survival struggle of a
threatened DG [Director General]; no encouragement
for staff – mistakes but not successes being escalated;
fear reigns with staff which inhibits release of positive
energies” are widespread (p. 145). To this can be added
excessive silo-effects within organisations and between
organisations as well as attempts at change that lack
systemic insight, thus making things worse. For example,
the closure of ESPU (Endangered Species Protection
Unit) within the SA police by disgraced former police
commissioner Jackie Selebi (p. 182): “Selebi’s ‘integrat-
ed approach’ was supposed to work better, but it was a
dismal failure”. On-going organisational and institution-
al failure is a tragedy of the same magnitude as the loss of
our mega fauna.
Changing “frames” and institutions
There are emergent themes apparent to a reader who
understands the difference between framing a situation
such as rhino poaching as “wicked” rather than “tame”.
Hanks is aware of some of these but apparently not others.
For example, themost pervasive institutional arrangement
that runs through Hanks’ story is that of “projectiﬁcation”.
An institution is a norm, policy, practice, “rule of the
game” that we humans have invented and use either
formally (e.g., projects) or informally (e.g., family meal
times).“Projects”as formaldevices toorganisewhatwedo
began to become popular about a 100 years ago; we now
live in a world where it is seemingly unimaginable that
what we seek to do is not projectiﬁed! In a corrupt regime
a project is a device to siphon off money; for an NGO it
is a device to show action, impact, deliverables and thus
build a narrative of justiﬁcation to donors and policy
makers. The observant reader of Hanks’ book will realise
that much of the time he and others were concerned with
getting the next project into place, delivering on the current
one and possibly, just possibly, learning and acting on the
basis of the last one!
Projects as an institutional form are lousy at dealing
with situations of uncertainty, complexity, interdepen-
dencies with multiple stakeholders and thus perspectives
(i.e., the features of a situation that justify a “wicked”
framing). Projects are also inadequate forms because
they are subjected to “project management” rather than
crafting new institutions that are long term and can effect
systemic governance, or governing of issues that will
remain relevant or of concern to a society over a long
period of time (i.e., beyond the 3-4 year project and
election cycle). Systemic co-inquiry and models of co-
research and co-design exemplify the shift needed as
does the possibility of investing in “social learning” as an
alternative governance mechanism to that of regulation
and enforcement, ﬁscal or market mechanisms and
education or information provision8.
In Hanks’ story the project brings with it some other
practices that undermine effectiveness. These include,
knowingly or not, a widespread commitment and belief
in science as the most credible and best form of
knowledge9 within the main conservation organisations
and in some pockets of Conservation Ministries. Good
science is always necessary but never sufﬁcient and it
has often been deployed at the expense of local and
7Bonner R., 1993. At the hand of man: peril and hope for
Africa’s wildlife, London, Simon & Schuster.
8 Ison R.L., 2010. Systems practice: how to act in a climate-
change world, London, Springer & The Open University.
9 Scientism is non-reﬂexive belief in the universal applicability
of the scientiﬁc method and approach, and the view that
empirical science constitutes the most “authoritative” world-
view or the most valuable part of human learning – to the
exclusion of other viewpoints.
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indigenous knowledge; decision making on the basis of
modelling can similarly lead into situations of conﬂict
(see pp. 94-95). As an issue develops over time insiders
and outsiders emerge as do particular “camps” (features
all too common of academic practice). Such patterns
exacerbate conﬂict and contestation rather than collabo-
ration and, through concerted action, transformation of
the issue of concern.
Within the Operation Lock story are institutional
elements and examples of practice that will continue to
be needed. Firstly the issue is beyond the boundaries of
any nation state thus mandating collaboration in many
forms, including an ability to generate intelligence,
undertake surveillance, monitor patterns, identify key
actors and smuggling pathways. However these capabil-
ities are meaningless in the absence of a platform that can
orchestrate effective action and to do this there must exist
a common purpose amongst political and policy elites
from different countries  in the poaching dilemma no
country is an island unto itself. Hanks claims that one of
Operation Lock’s most signiﬁcant contributions to
conservation efforts in southern Africa “was in training
and equipping anti-poaching teams to protect rhinos in
the ﬁeld”. He says (p. 107) “nobody can dispute that a
well-trained and highly motivated APU (Anti Poaching
Unit) properly equipped with weapons, radios and
transport can act as a serious deterrent to poachers,
especially if the unit enjoys the support of the
communities adjacent to the protected areas”. He argues
the case for combining anti-poaching measures with
“realistic programme[s] to win the support of the local
population, either by employing people from the
community or promoting wildlife-linked job opportu-
nities, such as tourism or sustainable use of wildlife
through hunting”. He concludes that this vital component
of the operation was given far too little attention, which is
certainly the case. However, it could be argued that
Hanks himself pays too little attention to this issue
throughout the book.
A widespread phenomenon in the ﬁelds of conserva-
tion and natural resources management is the lack of
attention paid to securing the learning from one project to
the next, one policy maker to the next, or one government
to the next. This is partly a problem of projectiﬁcation
and organisational silos but is more profoundly and
disturbingly symptomatic of systemic failure of gover-
nance. Key actors in Operation Lock were prescient in
their insight  they understood the systemic dynamics
enough to claim at the end of 1989 that Mozambique
would face a poaching onslaught after the end of the civil
war and that after Mozambique “has been cleaned up by
the poachers, they will turn their attention towards South
African game reserves, such as the Kruger National Park,
even if it is a tougher nut to crack” (p. 110). This is
exactly what happened in 2012 and what was the
response? The appointment of a retired general, a
continuation of the war on a new battleﬁeld, and the
diversion of rangers and ﬁeld staff in Kruger away from
their roles in management to become frontline soldiers in
the new battle!
Wars soak up precious investment funds depriving
other ﬁelds of endeavour of funds, personnel, organisa-
tional and political support. This is the case in Kruger
where a 20 year “experiment” with strategic adaptive
management (SAM) has been undermined; this interna-
tionally recognised success story in harnessing new ways
of thinking and acting for park governance (an
innovative response to dealing with a “wicked problem”)
is at the moment seriously in danger of becoming a
casualty of war! Had politicians and international NGOs
opted for a “wicked framing” choice SAM may have
been the recipient of investment to more boldly innovate
by, for example, involving communities outside the
current park boundaries, combining livelihood enhance-
ment with co-governance arrangements and further
breaking down siloed ways of operating.
Hanks appears to have consistently supported the
place of local community as stakeholders in the future of
conservation  but his book provides little evidence of
investment, good practice examples and institutional and
governance reforms needed to create and sustain such
initiatives  this arm of policy if it has existed in any
meaningful way is failing, or has failed to date. Quite
clearly livelihoods and well-being transcend the bound-
aries and policies of the nation state  so concerted
action across boundaries is needed. Kruger would be a
good place to start building on the legacy, such as it is, of
strategic adaptive management re-framed as systemic
and adaptive co-governing. The way forward requires
real partnerships between international donors, NGOs,
and communities that explicitly recognise and account
for the points above. This necessitates greater investment
into partnership building with on-ground communities as
well as governments, and processes that support this over
10-20 year time horizons at minimum. The alternative is
to persist with the war metaphor and its enactment, the
habituated response with no end in sight as to when this
framing and strategy may actually turn the poaching
crisis around. Signiﬁcantly the “current war” is not even
a contemporary version of war, which would be a war
conducted through satellites and cyber-espionage (at
least that we know of  hints in his book suggest it may
be otherwise).
There is already evidence that the “war” framing is
migrating into a “terror” variation  incorporating the
war on rhinos into a sphere of action in the greater war on
terror. There is compelling evidence historically that
insurgency movements poached animals, especially for
ivory, to fund their military activity. There is little doubt,
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given the money that can be realised, that similar
activities exist now. However, further militarisation is
unlikely in the long run to secure the hearts and minds of
those whose livelihoods are at risk on a daily basis. Can
we persist with so much resource devoted to a defence/
fortress strategy where the primary target is the poacher?
Hanks argues that the identities of the kingpings behind
the illegal trade are known but nobody dares to name
them. Thus, “failure to enforce laws is no reason to
introduce new ones. This is political failure” (p. 205).
Hanks argues that “it is not a question of either a
community approach or a military approach for every
situation. Both have a very important role to play and
they should not be seen as mutually exclusive” (p. 192).
In defending himself against being wedded to a military
imperialistic approach Hanks cites extracts from
Raymond Bonner’s At the hand of man quoting him
as saying: “at all costs, we must avoid planning upon
people, telling them what to do without any form of
consultation whatsoever”. Unfortunately most attempts
at consultation are poorly conducted and are rarely
deepened into active participation and co-design or co-
governance models that generate sustained social
learning, and new institutions, new rules and thus
understandings and practices for governance reform. The
tragedy unfolding is that SAM held this promise. Hanks
is too quiet on this front, as exempliﬁed by the paucity of
case studies on which he draws. Mandela, who Hanks
claims was supportive of conservation, said in an
interview: “It is important for conservation and rural
development to be combined. Conservationists must take
into account the needs of people around the reserves.
They need to encourage education programmes about
protecting wildlife and always act in co-operation with
the local communities” (p. 193). Despite repeated
avowals, Hanks persists in putting in-the-ﬁeld-protection
at the top of his list for investment and action. As he
acknowledges “this is easier said than done” and because
“throughout Africa wildlife conservation is viewed as a
luxury in the face of mounting external debt, rising
unemployment, and increasing demand for housing,
health facilities and free education, exacerbated by high
rates of inﬂation and declining terms of trade”we suggest
other strategies need to be prioritised and pursued.
If all concerned actors with a stake in the rhino issue
were to pay attention to their framing choices and engage
in deliberative, cooperative governance innovation then
it might be possible to arrive at accommodations of
difference on the basis that: “there is no single solution to
addressing the growing illegal trade in rhino horn, in
spite of some of the regrettably naive options promoted
by genuinely concerned individuals” and “most of the
actions that may be taken fall outside the ambit of the
professional conservationists and are rarely addressed
or even mentioned by the majority of environmental
NGOs”. Hanks knows that effective action “is the
province of no one organisation” and that “complexity is
overlooked or ignored” (p. 203). Grasping for a viable
future he suggests that: “Perhaps some new words are
needed in the daily soup of conservation vocabulary, not
just for the sake of novelty or change, but to stimulate a
new way of thinking about the issues of concern”. We
suggest that whilst necessary this is far too limited an
ambition; the requisite concepts and practices already
exist but they are not deployed in ways that give rise to
the emergence of an “ecology of mind” able to break
through the limitations of historical framings, practices
and understandings and, which through enacting our
concerns for the future of the megafauna, transforms who
we are in the process.
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